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INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Hawaii became the first state to suggest that it may be un-
constitutional to deny gay and lesbian couples the right to marry.' For
many, this declaration was seen as the logical culmination of a civil
rights movement characterized by a struggle for recognition and accep-
tance. For others, it was a clear warning that gay and lesbian marriage
could spread across the nation and eventually place homosexual rela-
tionships on equal footing with heterosexual relationships. In response
to this concern, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") in 1996.2
DOMA accomplishes two things. First, it allows states to "defend"
their marriage standards by permitting them to withhold legal recogni-
tion from same-sex marriages that take place in other states.3 Second, it
defines marriage for all federal purposes as a "legal union between one
man and one woman" and spouse as "a person of the opposite sex who
is a husband or a wife." 4 However, even though the second prong of
DOMA essentially sets forth a marriage standard applicable in all federal
contexts, it does not define "man," "woman," or "opposite sex."5
This shortcoming is problematic for individuals not easily classified
as male or female, individuals such as post-operative transsexuals (trans-
1. See Jeffrey Schmalz, In Hawaii, Step Toward Legalized Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1993, at A5.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
3. 1 U.S.C. § 7. Many feel that DOMA is unconstitutional for this reason. See, e.g.,
Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages,
and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 307 (1998) (arguing
that DOMA is an unconstitutional product of legislative efforts to amend the Full
Faith and Credit Clause); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the
Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Funda-
mental Interests, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 921, 986 (1995) (arguing that refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages violates equal protection and due process guarantees);
Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills ofAttainder, and the Definition of Punishment:
On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 SYRA-
cusE L. RaV. 227 (1998) (arguing that DOMA involves a bill of attainder); Mark
Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the
Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 553 (1999) (arguing that DOMA abridges privi-
leges and immunities guarantees); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The Supreme
Court's Decision in Romer v. Evans and its Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act,
16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 217, 217 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court analysis
applied in Romer v. Evans would, if applied to DOMA, reveal that it is unconstitu-
tional).
4. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
5. 1U.S.C. §7.
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sexuals who have undergone hormone therapy, sex-realignment surgery,
and other procedures to reconcile some or all of their physical sexual
6attributes with their psychological sex). Since DOMA provides no
guidance whether post-operative transsexuals would be considered male
or female, it remains an open question7 whether they can take advantage
of federal benefits available to married couples, or whether DOIA
would characterize transsexual marriages as same-sex, and hence pre-
clude their legal recognition.8
This Article addresses this question through an examination of
post-operative transsexual immigration via marriage. Part I describes the
federal immigration benefits available to spouses of most U.S. citizens
and presents the historical and contemporary obstacles that prohibit
these benefits from being extended to gays and lesbians. It then ad-
dresses DOMA's failure to define "opposite sex," and hence DOMA's
failure to indicate whether post-operative transsexuals, or their partners,
should be given "spousal status" under current U.S. immigration law.
Part II examines traditional and modern notions of sex. It traces
state legal approaches to transsexual marriage and ultimately disentan-
gles the formalistic rhetoric that obfuscates the reasoning in those cases.
In particular, Part II focuses on a 2002 Kansas case that attempts to
make sense of the conflicting positions states have taken with respect to
6. Since these procedures are expensive and often risky, many transsexuals elect to forgo
them. Given judicial concern that homosexuals could claim marital status by fraudu-
lently dedaring one spouse is transsexual, evidence of transsexualism beyond mere self
identification as a transsexual is universally required. The adjective post-operative
signals only that some level of readily quantifiable evidence of transsexualism is avail-
able; an "operation" is not a prerequisite for classification as post-operative. In fact,
many male-to-female post-operative transsexuals only undergo hormone therapy and
hair removal. For a definition of transsexual, see infra note 51 and accompanying
text.
7. DOMA's applicability to post-operative transsexuals remains an open question in
large part because attorneys working with transsexual clients seek practical solutions
to DOMA's failure to define "man," "woman," and "opposite sex." See, e.g., Elise
Keppler, Transgender Asylum & Immigration, May 15, 2001 at 18-19 (recommend-
ing that transsexuals who seek to immigrate via marriage to a U.S. citizen should first
attempt to obtain documentation that reflects "the person and their partner [as] a
male-female couple." If this documentation cannot be obtained, the author suggests
filing a fianc6 petition and attaching a letter "that adequately explains that this person
will, in fact, transition to a gender that enables them to marry their partner once in
the state they will reside in the United States. In such cases, letters from doctors that
can document the foreign national's current gender will greatly strengthen the peti-
tion.") (unpublished paper, on file with the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Rights
Task Force).
8. This Article was suggested by Pradeep Singla, former Legal Director of Immigration
Equality, in response to this legal uncertainty.
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transsexual marriage.9 That case draws a misleading distinction between
sex determination "as a matter of law," and sex determination "as a mat-
ter of fact," and hence adds to, rather than detracts from, the
confusion.' Part II demonstrates that sex determination in the absence
of a legislative standard is inherently a mixed question of law and fact."
Courts addressing transsexuals must establish sex-determination stan-
dards to define as a matter of law what it means to be male or female,
and then must determine as a matter of fact whether post-operative
transsexuals are male or female under those standards. 2
Part III addresses transsexual immigration via marriage. Looking
behind the veil of formalism pierced in Part II, Part III takes a compara-
tive law approach to transsexual sex determination. It examines the
positions that federal courts, state courts and legislatures, foreign gov-
ernments, and the European Court of Human Rights have taken on the
underlying determinations that unify the transsexual marriage cases
brought forth in Part II.
I. IMMIGRATION VIA MARRIAGE
The Immigration and Nationality Act ("I.N.A."),' 3 which governs
admission of all immigrants to the United States, enables family mem-
bers of U.S. citizens to obtain permanent resident status. Of the various
family relationships recognized by the I.N.A., the spousal relationship is
among the most privileged. 4 Foreign national spouses, for example, can
be naturalized more quickly than can other immigrants, 1" and there is
no annual limit to the number of visas available to spouses of U.S. citi-
16
zens.
In order to receive an immigrant visa via marriage to a U.S. citizen,
a foreign national must demonstrate that he or she intends to live in-
9. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part 11.B.1.
12. The Gardiner court implied that taking a matter-of-law approach to sex determina-
tion meant applying as a matter of law a pre-existing legislative sex-determination
standard. In fact, the court crafted and applied its own standard. See infra Part B.II.2.
13. The I.N.A. is codified in Title 8 of the United States Code.
14. See Sandra E. Lundy, "I Do" But I Can't: Immigration Policy and Gay Domestic Rela-
tionships, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y Ruv. 185, 198 (1986).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 319(a), 319(b) [hereinafter I.N.A.], 8 U.S.C.
§§ 14 30(a), 1430(b) (2000).
16. I.N.A. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000) (limiting the number of visas available
for non-spousal "immediate relatives").
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definitely in the United States and must qualify as a "spouse" under sec-
tion 201(b) of the I.N.A. 17 Although the I.N.A. does not define spouse,
courts interpreting the term have determined that a wide variety of
marital relationships-including those that do not conform to American
customs-are sufficient to confer spousal status under the Act.18 How-
ever, despite this broad interpretation of spouse, and despite a long
history of family reunification in U.S. immigration policy, 9 a same-sex
marriage between a U.S. citizen and a foreign national does not confer
spousal status under the I.N.A.2 °
A. Gay and Lesbian Immigration via Marriage
The need to adopt a sex-determination standard for transsexuals in
the context of immigration via marriage, discussed infra, is necessitated
by a prohibition against gay and lesbian immigration via marriage. This
prohibition provides a backdrop for any court or government agency
addressing transsexual immigration and attaches significant conse-
quences to any sex-determination standard ultimately adopted.
1. Adams v. Howerton
Decided in 1982 by the Ninth Circuit, Adams governed gay and
lesbian immigration via marriage before the 1996 passage of the
DOMA." Adams, a male American citizen, and Sullivan, a male alien,
17. I.N.A. § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
18. See, e.g., Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1958) (determining
that "[i]n order to be legitimate a marriage need not conform to American cus-
toms."). See also In re T, 1 I & N Dec. 529, 531 (B.I.A. 1960) (declaring that "[t]he
presumption of the validity of a marriage duly celebrated is a very strong one and
should be overturned reluctantly, and then only by persuasive specific evidence re-
quiring a contrary finding.").
19. See U.S. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE POL'Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POL-
ICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 112 (1981) (articulating family reunification as a
primary goal of U.S. immigration policy).
20. Although spousal status is not conferred for immigration purposes, the I.N.S. may
not have the power to deport selectively foreign same-sex partners civilly united to
U.S. citizens. See Victor C. Romero, The Selective Deportation of Same-Gender Part-
ners: In Search of the "Rara Avis, " 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 537 (2002).
21. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). No other federal circuit has departed from the
precedent established in Adams. DOMA defines spouse for federal purposes and
hence eliminates the need for judicial inquiries into whether "spouse" as used in the
I.N.A. encompasses same-sex couples. Therefore, it is likely that Adams will remain
2004]
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challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision denying classifi-
cation of Sullivan as an immediate relative of Adams.22 Interestingly, the
court began its analysis not by examining the validity of Adams' same-
sex marriage to Howerton under Colorado law, but by examining the
intent of Congress with respect to the conferral of spousal status under
section 201(b) of the I.N.A . 3 The court, relying on Boutilier v. INS,24
concluded that:
Even if the Adams-Sullivan marriage were valid under Colo-
rado law, the marriage might still be insufficient to confer
spouse status for purposes of federal immigration law. So long
as Congress acts within constitutional constraints, it may de-
termine the conditions under which immigration visas are
issued. Therefore, the intent of Congress governs the conferral
of spouse status under section 201(b), and a valid marriage is
determinative only if Congress so intends.25
The court then deduced that it was "unlikely that Congress in-
tended to give homosexual spouses preferential admission treatment
under section 201 (b) of the Act when, in the very same amendments
adding that section, it mandated their exclusion [gays and lesbians were
considered to have 'psychopathic personalities' and hence ineligible for
immigration]. 26 The court concluded that Congress's decision to confer
spousal status only upon heterosexuals has a rational basis and is there-
fore constitutional.27
By refusing to overturn the Board of Immigration Appeals' deci-
sion to deny Sullivan status as an immediate relative, Adams established
federal precedent that is frequently cited as a judicial barrier to gay and
the leading judicial precedent on the question of extending immigration benefits to
foreign national same-sex spouses.
22. Id. at 1036.
23. Id. at 1039.
24. In Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967), the Supreme Court determined that
the "legislative history of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act indicates beyond a
shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality'
to include homosexuals."
25. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039.
26. Id. at 1040-41 (mandating gay and lesbian exclusion through the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality").
27. Id. at 1042.
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lesbian immigration via marriage. 28 This barrier was reinforced by the
passage of the DOMA in 1996.
2. The Defense of Marriage Act: A Statutory Barrier to
Gay and Lesbian Immigration via Marriage
Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of gay and
lesbian immigration via marriage, it is possible that other federal circuits
could deviate from the precedent set by the Ninth Circuit in Adams.
However, this scenario is unlikely because in 1996, Congress passed the
DOMA in response to state developments regarding same-sex mar-
riage.29 DOMA defines marriage for any "[a]ct of Congress" and "any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bu-
reaus and agencies of the United States" as a "legal union between one
man and one woman" and defines spouse for the same purposes as "a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."3° Therefore, the
Immigration and Nationality Act's use of "spouse" is directly regulated
by DOMA,"1 and reliance on judicial interpretation of the term
"spouse" with respect to gay and lesbian inclusion is no longer neces-
32
sary.
DOMA, however, fails to define "opposite sex," "man," or
"woman." 3  Consequently, post-operative transsexual 34 immigration via
28. Because Adams relied heavily on Boutilier, which in turn relied heavily on homosexual
inclusion under the phrase 'psychopathic personality,' many argue that Adams should
no longer preclude gay and lesbian immigration via marriage. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text. The exclusion ground mentioned in Boutilier was repealed in
1990, and thereafter gays and lesbians were no longer inadmissible simply because of
their sexual orientation. See Denise C. Hammond, Immigration and Sexual Orienta-
tion: Developing Standards, Options and Obstacles, in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 113
(2000).
29. See, e.g., Senator Helms, 142 CONG. Rac. S10068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (address-
ing the need for DOMA, Sen. Helms stated, "Indeed, Mr. President, the pending
bill-the Defense of Marriage Act-will safeguard the sacred institutions of marriage
and the family from those who seek to destroy them and who are willing to tear apart
America's moral fabric in the process.").
30. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
31. The General Accounting Office (GAO) Report on the Defense of Marriage Act ar-
ticulates DOMA's definitional impact on immigration law. See GAO Rep. No. B-
275860, at 3 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf.
32. DOMA, may be unconstitutional. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
34. For definitions of transsexual and post-operative transsexual, see infia notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
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marriage remains an open question. Since DOMA serves as a statutory
barrier to same-sex marriage, the possibility of transsexual immigration
via marriage turns upon whether post-operative transsexual marriages
are legally recognized as "same-sex" or "opposite-sex." That, in turn,
depends on whether pre- or post-operative sex is recognized. For exam-
ple, if transsexuals are recognized as being of their post-operative sex,
then male-to-female transsexuals would be legally female and spousal
status could be extended to male partners, and vice-versa.35 On the other
hand, if post-operative transsexuals are recognized as their pre-operative
physical sex-the standard adopted in a slight majority of the few U.S.
36transsexual marriage cases -then DOMA would preclude the conferral
of spousal status unless male-to-female transsexuals married females, and
female-to-male transsexuals married males. Essentially, this sex recogni-
tion standard would extend spousal status in marriages where post-
operative transsexuals physically are the same sex as their spouses-
marriages that for all intents and purposes resemble those which
DOMA seeks to prevent-but would not extend spousal status in mar-
riages where post-operative transsexuals are physically and
psychologically the opposite sex of their spouses. In other words, a sex-
determination standard that blinds itself to post-operative changes could
lead to immigration via gay marriage, while one that recognizes these
changes could lead to immigration via marriages that are physically and
psychologically between individuals of the "opposite sex.""
DOMA, by blocking recognition of same-sex marriages for federal
purposes, sets the stage for an unfortunate, but nonetheless interesting,
judicial inquiry into what it means to be male and female, and hence
what it means to be in a legally cognizable marriage between individuals
of the "opposite sex."
35. For simplicity's sake, this Article uses as examples marriages between post-operative
transsexual individuals and individuals who are not transsexual. Other marriage com-
binations are, of course, possible. A male-to-female post-operative transsexual could,
for example, marry a female-to-male post-operative transsexual under a sex-
determination standard that legally classifies transsexuals as their post-operative sex.
36. See infia note 58 and accompanying text. This Article demonstrates that even though
a slight majority of U.S. state courts have adopted pre-operarive sex-determination
standards, they do so not out of legislative deference, fairness, or precedent; they do
so because of an underlying rejection of transsexuals themselves. See infra Part II.B.2.
37. There are additional reasons why a post-operative sex-determination standard instead
of a pre-operative standard should be adopted in the context of immigration via mar-
riage. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 10:237
SEX DETERMINATION FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES
II. DEFINING MAN AND WOMAN
A. Traditional and Modern Notions of Sex
DOMA's failure to define "opposite sex," "man," or "woman" is
not surprising. Embedded in American consciousness and American
jurisprudence is an assumption that the delineation between "man" and
"woman" is clear, precise, and intuitive. Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
of the Court of Appeals of Texas, speaks for many when he writes that
"[e]very schoolchild, even of tender years, is confident he or she can tell
the difference [between a man and a woman], especially if the person is
wearing no clothes."38
1. Intersex Individuals
A binary sex paradigm, however, is precarious. Millions of people
do not fall neatly into either a male or female category.39 Health profes-
sionals recognize that many factors contribute to the determination of
an individual's sex:
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex-XY or XX;
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)-testes or ovaries;
3. Internal morphologic sex (determined after three months
gestation)-seminal vesicles/prostrate [sic] or va-
gina/uterus/fallopian tubes;
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia)-penis/scrotum or
clitoris/labia;
5. Hormonal sex-androgens or estrogens;
6. Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features)-facial and
chest hair or breasts;
7. Assigned sex and gender of rearing; and
8. Sexual identity.
4 °
In most cases these factors align, and sex determination is uncon-
troversial." When these factors do not align, however, an intersex
38. Litteton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999).
39. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
Between Law and Biology, 41 AIZ. L. R'v. 265, 278-92 (1999).
40. Id. at 278.
41. Id.
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condition results,42 and sex determination can be difficult.43 Examples of
intersex conditions include chromosomal ambiguity (XXX, XXY,
XXXY, XYY, XYYY, XYYYY, and XO), 44 gonadal ambiguity (gonads
that do not appear to function as either ovaries or testes; ovotestes-a
combination of both male and female gonads, or one ovary and one tes-
tis), and external morphologic sex ambiguity (external genitalia are
neither clearly male nor clearly female). 45 Researchers estimate that inter-
46sex conditions may affect up to one out of every 2,000 children born.
Until very recently, it was U.S. medical policy to surgically assign
intersex children "to an 'appropriate' sex prior to the age of two, if not
earlier."47 In most cases, physicians believed so strongly that children
should be able to be easily classified as male or female that they would
recommend immediate sex reassignment surgery. Now, however, "a
growing number of physicians and other health professionals are sug-
gesting that, in many cases, surgical revision should wait until the child
comes of age and can decide for itself whether to undergo surgery di-
rected towards achieving male or female appearance."49 This trend,
coupled with DOMA's failure to address such individuals, emphasizes
the need for future courts to adopt sex-determination standards that
account for the sexual complexity found in our society."
42. For general information about intersex individuals, see Intersex Society of North
America, at http://www.isna.org.
43. See Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & The Law, 11
ANNALS HEALTH L. 195 (exploring the medical and legal communities' struggle to
address the needs of intersex children).
44. Normally, an individual is born with forty-six chromosomes, two of which determine
sex. Typically a male is born with XY chromosomes and a female with XX chromo-
somes.
45. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 281 (discussing the many circumstances that may
lead to an intersex condition).
46. Julia S. Barthold & Ricardo Gonzilez, Intersex States, in PEDIATRIC UROLOGY PRAC-
TICE 547 (Edmond T. Gonzales & Stuart B. Bauer eds., 1999).
47. Hermer, supra note 43, at 196.
48. Id. (noting that physicians believed it was "so important for parents to be able to
identify a child as male or female at birth, based on the appearance of the child's sex
organs, that they would suggest immediate surgical reassignment").
49. Id. at 198.
50. This argument is not to suggest that DOMA's definitional deficit is merely a future
problem. See, e.g., Keppler, supra note 7 (suggesting that "DOMA's applicability to
post-operative transsexuals remains an open question in large part because attorneys
working with transsexual clients seek practical solutions to DOMA's failure to define
'man,' 'woman,' and 'opposite sex.' ").
[Vol. 10:237
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2. Transsexual Individuals
Like intersex individuals, transsexual individuals are also not easily
classified using a binary approach to sex. Many transsexual individuals
are intersex, although some are not. The common characteristic they
share is a disconnect between some or all of their physical sexual attrib-
utes and their psychological sense of self.5 Sometimes this disconnect
can lead to "[t]he desire to change one's anatomic sexual characteristics
to conform physically with one's perception of self as a member of the
opposite sex."52 Anatomic sexual characteristics can be changed through
hormone treatment and sex realignment surgery. Transsexual individu-
als who elect to correct their physical sexual characteristics through this
process are often referred to as post-operative transsexual individuals.53
In a legal world governed by a binary paradigm of male and female,
the status of intersexuals and transsexuals is uncertain, and hence
DOMA's failure to clearly define "opposite sex," "man," and "woman"
is troubling. Fortunately, there are signs that courts and legislatures will
eventually abandon this binary model in favor of one that more accu-
rately reflects the complex nature of sex. In 2002, the Supreme Court of
Kansas acknowledged in In re Estate of Gardiner that "sexual identifica-
tion is not simply a matter of anatomy, as demonstrated by a number of
intersex conditions."54 Likewise, in 1999, Justice Karen Angelini of the
Court of Appeals of Texas, noted that "[w]e must recognize the fact
that, even when biological factors are considered, there are those indi-
viduals whose sex may be ambiguous." Although both the Kansas and
Texas cases exhibited legislative assumptions about the nature of sex and
although both ultimately relied on "traditional" notions of sex, the judi-
cial notice of research on sex determination bodes well for future cases
51. See Katrina C. Rose, Sign of a Wave? The Kansas Court of Appeals Rejects Texas Sim-
plicity in Favor of Transsexual Reality, 70 UMKC L. REv. 257, 257 n.2 (2001). See
also HOLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF DUALITY 19
(1989) (defining transsexuals as "persons of one gender mistakenly born into the
body of the wrong sex").
52. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1841 (26th ed. 1995), available at www.
batlaw.org/transexual.htm.
53. According to the American Psychiatric Association, approximately 1 per 30,000 adult
males and 1 per 100,000 adult females seek sex-reassignment surgery. See DIAGNOS-
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 535 (4th ed. 1994).
54. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 132 (Kan. 2002) (citing Greenberg, supra note
39).
55. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. App. 1999), (Angelini, J., concurring)
(citing Greenberg, supra note 39).
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in which sex classification is an issue, and will perhaps influence law-
makers to address expressly those individuals who cannot be neatly
classified as male or female.
DOMA, however, does not expressly address those individuals.56
Therefore, in order to adopt a well-informed sex-determination stan-
dard for transsexuals in the immigration via marriage context, it is
necessary to first examine the various legal approaches that courts have
taken to determine transsexual sex for purposes of marriage.57
B. LegalApproaches to Post-Operative Transsexual Marriage
Given the binary male/female assumption of sex classification un-
der which most lawmakers operate and the degree to which the
transsexual condition is alien and uncomfortable to most individuals, it
is not surprising that it has often been left to courts to determine the
legal status of post-operative transsexuals. Nor is it surprising that courts
have taken a variety of approaches to this issue in the context of mar-
riage." Some courts, for example, lace their opinions with religious
56. See infra Part III.
57. The parallels between a prohibition on gay and lesbian marriage leading to judicial
inquiries into the private realm of sex and the pre-Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967), prohibition on interracial marriage leading to judicial inquiries into the pri-
vate realm of race are undeniable. In both situations, the judicial branch is awkwardly
placed in the role of determining what an individual is (male, female, black, white)
for purposes of permitting, or denying, that person the right to marry. For more in-
formation on the judicial quest to define race, see [AN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE By
LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
58. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Michael J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA,
511998DR005375xxxxWS (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2003), at http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf (holding that a female-to-male
transsexual was legally female for purposes of marriage in Florida); In re Estate of Gar-
diner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002) (holding that "[a] male-to-female transsexual does
not fit the definition of a female" and is therefore a male for marital purposes in Kan-
sas); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that a male-
to-female post-operative transsexual's marriage to a male was valid); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (holding that post-
marital male-to-female operation may have changed sex, but "removal of the male or-
gans would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female"); B v. B, 355
N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (holding that female-to-male transsexual
did not possess "necessary apparatus" to consummate relationship and therefore re-
quested annulment of "marriage" was granted); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (holding that post-operative male-to-female transsexual was
legally a male and therefore could not be issued a marriage license to marry another
male); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that a
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rhetoric and view post-operative sex recognition as thwarting the will of
God.59 Other cases view post-operative sex recognition as the logical
outcome of the medical reconciliation of physical sexual attributes with
psychological sex.60
1. The Kansas "Synthesis"
In March of 2002, in In re Gardiner, the Supreme Court of Kansas
addressed the validity of a marriage between a male and a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual and attempted to synthesize a theory that
would distinguish those cases which held post-operative transsexual
61marriage to be valid and those which did not. In that case, a son
sought to invalidate his father's marriage to his wife, J'Noel (a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual), after his father died intestate.62
J'Noel was born with male genitalia but considered herself female.63 She
underwent electrolysis and thermolysis to remove body hair on the face,
neck, and chest. 4 She took hormones and had a tracheal shave to
65change her voice. She had a bilateral orchiectomy to remove the testi-
cles, a forehead/eyebrow lift, and rhinoplasty. J'Noel consulted with a
psychiatrist who found "no signs of thought disorder or major affective
physician cannot "change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counsel-
ing" and therefore for marital purposes in Texas a post-operative transsexual is legally
the pre-operative sex); In re Kevin, [2001] FamCA 1074 (holding that for purposes of
Australian law all relevant matters must be considered and that sex for marital pur-
poses should be determined at the date of the marriage); Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All
E.R. 33 (P. 1970) (determining that sex for marriage purposes in England is to be de-
termined by the application of chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests where these
are congruent and without regard to any surgical intervention); Attorney General v.
Otahuhu Family Court, (1995) 1 NZLR 603 (holding for purposes of New Zealand
marital law that post-operative transsexuals are legally the post-operative sex); Lim
Ying v. Hiok Kian Ming Eric, (1992) 1 SLR 184 (holding for purposes of Singapore
marital law post-operative transsexuals are legally their pre-operative sex).
59. See, e.g., Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224 (framing the issue as: "[c]an a physician change
the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?")
60. See, e.g., M.T., 355 A.2d at 209 ("[I]f the anatomical or genital features of a genuine
transsexual are made to conform to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex,
then identity by sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards.").
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disorder, that [she] fully understood the nature of the process of trans-
sexual change, and that her life history was consistent with a diagnosis of
transsexualism.,67 The psychiatrist recommended "that total sex reas-
signment was the next appropriate step in her treatment," and in 1994
J'Noel underwent further surgery.6 Afterwards, her surgeon wrote that
she had a "fully functional vagina" and should be considered "a func-
tioning, anatomical female.,
69
The Kansas court acknowledged that many judicial approaches to
sex determination within the context of transsexual marriage existed. It
concluded, though, that the "essential difference between the line of
cases ... that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage and the line of
cases ... that would validate it is that the former treats a person's sex as
a matter of law and the latter treats a person's sex as a matter of fact.,
71
This treatment, according to the court, depended on whether the cases
reflected a view that there is a "mental component, as well as an ana-
tomical component, to each person's sexual identity."72
In essence, the synthesis offered in Gardiner is correct. The ulti-
mate rejection or acceptance of a marriage involving a post-operative
transsexual individual often does depend on whether a court accepts
current scientific understanding that there is a mental component as
well as an anatomical component to sex determination.73 However, the
court's conclusion that acceptance of the mental component leads to a
matter-of-fact approach and that rejection of it leads to a matter-of-law
approach is misleading. Xhile the Gardiner court implied that taking a
matter-of-law approach to sex determination meant applying as a matter
of law a pre-existing legislative sex-determination standard, the court
actually crafted and applied its own standard.74
Absent both express statutory language classifying transsexuals and
an indication of legislative intent, sex determination is inherently a
75mixed question of law and fact. In such circumstances, a pure matter-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 122-23 (quoting letter from Eugene Schrang, M.D., October 1994).
70. Id. at 124-36.
71. Id. at 132-33.
72. Id. at 124.
73. See infra Part II.B.2.
74. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
75. The Family Court of Australia at Sydney stated it this way: "I take it to be a question
of law what criteria should be applied in determining whether a person is a man or a
woman for the purpose of the law of marriage, and a question of fact whether the cri-
teria exist in a particular case." In re Kevin, [2001] FamCA 1074.
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of-law approach to sex determination is a judicial myth. Courts do not
simply apply a pre-existing sex-determination standard; they must craft
one for themselves and then determine as a matter of fact whether the
transsexual in question qualifies under that standard as male or female.
What the Gardiner court calls a matter-of-law approach to sex determi-
nation translates only into a rejection of the belief that physical sex can
be changed through medical procedures such as hormone treatment and
surgery, which necessarily leads to a rejection of a factual inquiry into
whether that process has been completed. However, a factual inquiry
into sex is still necessary.
In Gardiner, for example, the court decided that it would follow
the line of cases that rejected a mental component to sex determination
and would therefore "view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and
not fact."7 6 The court proceeded, however, to launch a factual inquiry
into J'Noel's sex in order to determine if she was, in fact, the opposite
sex of her husband, and therefore to determine whether or not her mar-
riage to him was valid.77 The court began this inquiry by looking up the
definitions of "sex" and "marriage" in a 1999 version of Black's Law
Dictionary and "male" and "female" in a 1970 version of Webster's New
Twentieth Century Dictionary.78 As cited by the court, Webster's Diction-
ary defined female as "designating or of the sex that produces ova and
bears offspring: opposed to male."79 The court then determined, as a
matter of fact, that "J'Noel does not fit the common meaning of a fe-
male" because the "ability to 'produce ova and bear offspring' does not
and never did exist."8° In other words, the court declared as a matter of
law that a female is someone who produces ova and bears offspring and
that as a matter of fact J'Noel did not possess either characteristic and
therefore was not a female.
The court attempted to cloak its judicial adoption of a sex-
determination standard by couching it in language of legislative
deference. 8' The court asserted that "[w]ords in common usage are to be
given their natural and ordinary meaning" and that "[t]he words 'sex,'
'male,' and 'female' in everyday understanding do not encompass
76. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
77. Id. at 135-36.
78. Id. at 135.
79. Id. at 135.
80. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1999)).
81. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135-36. For an excellent analysis of the use of dictionary defini-
tions of man and woman in transsexual marriage cases, see In re Marriage of Michael
J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, 511998DR005375xxxxWS, at 695-98 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
2003), at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf.
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transsexuals. '82 It came to that conclusion by examining a 1970 version
of Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary. If it were truly the
court's intention to be deferential, it would have considered Kansas'
Administrative Regulations, which permit legal amendment of sex in the
event of sex realignment,83 instead of an outdated dictionary. Regardless
of the court's language, it clearly adopted a judicial sex-determination
standard and then applied that standard to J'Noel.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Texas in Littleton v. Prange, cited
extensively by the Gardiner court as being indicative of the line of cases
that adopt a matter-of-law approach, creates its own sex-determination
standard and then conducts a factual inquiry into the sex of the trans-
sexual in question. In Littleton, Christie Littleton, a transsexual who was
born with male physical attributes but underwent sex reassignment sur-
gery, brought a medical malpractice action in her capacity as surviving
spouse of a male patient.14 Two doctors testified that the definition of a
transsexual is "someone whose physical anatomy does not correspond to
their [sic] sense of being or their sense of gender."85 They further testi-
fied that "in arriving at a diagnosis of transsexualism in Christie, [they
were] guided by the guidelines established by the Johns Hopkins Group
and that, based on these guidelines, Christie was diagnosed ... as a...
transsexual ... [and was] psychologically and psychiatrically female be-
fore and after the sex reassignment surgery.... 86
Despite this testimony and current medical research on transsexu-
als, the Littleton court decided that "the case ... presents a pure
question of law and must be decided by this court."87 In deciding the
case, however, the court did not defer to legislative guidance on whether
transsexuals were male or female as a matter of law. Instead, the court
itself determined as a "matter of law" what it meant to be female in
Texas and determined as a matter of fact that Christie did not meet that
standard.88 The court concluded that "[t]ranssexual medical treatment[]
does not create the internal sexual organs of a wom[a]n (except for the
vaginal canal). There is no womb, cervix or ovaries in the post-operative
transsexual female."89 In addition, the court noted that "male chromo-
somes do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex
82. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
83. Kan. Admin. Regs. 28-17-20(b)(1)(A)(i)(West 2003).
84. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
85. Id. at 224.
86. Id. at 224-25.
87. Id. at 230.
88. Id. at231.
89. Id. at 230.
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reassignment surgery."9 Essentially, the court crafted a two-prong test
to determine sex: an inquiry into chromosomal makeup and an inquiry
into internal sexual organs. It then determined that as a matter of fact,
Christie Littleton "was created and born a male."9 The Littleton court
demonstrated once again that absent both express statutory language
classifying transsexuals and an indication of legislative intent, sex deter-
mination is inherently a mixed question of law and fact. The court
crafted its own standard, and then applied it.
2. The Kansas "Synthesis" Reexamined
This Article argues that the only strand unifying the line of trans-
sexual marriage cases that includes Gardiner and Littleton is not a pure
matter-of-law approach to sex determination, but a complete judicial
rejection of the medical recognition of transsexualism. Or, in the words
of the Gardiner court, a rejection of the idea that there is "a mental
component, as well as an anatomical component, to each person's sexual
identity.
9 2
This judicial rejection was apparent in Littleton when the court
dismissed the medical testimony described above and determined in-
stead that "a person's gender [is] immutably fixed at birth by our
Creator."93 The court noted that while "[s]ome physicians would con-
sider Christie a female ... [t]he body that [she] inhabits is a male body
in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied."94 Summa-
rizing its position, the Littleton court stated that "once a man, always a
man."95 Other courts have been even more direct. In Hartin v. Director
of the Bureau of Records, a New York Supreme Court took the position
that sex-realignment surgery is a "form of psychotherapy by which muti-
lating surgery is conducted on a person with the intent of setting his
mind at ease."96
The Gardiner court concluded that a matter-of-law approach to sex
determination was the logical offspring of this rejection of medical
recognition of transsexualism and that a matter-of-fact approach was the
logical offspring of its acceptance. As discussed, however, sex
90. Id.
91. Id. at 231.
92. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 124 (Kan. 2002).
93. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
94. Id. at 231.
95. Id. at 227.
96. 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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determination is always a mixed question of law and fact. A court must
first determine what standard it will use to decide who is a male and
who is a female and then conduct a factual inquiry into whether the
individual in question qualifies as male or female under that standard.
The true offspring of acceptance or rejection of medical recognition of
transsexualism is an inquiry, or lack thereof, into how far the transsexual
has physically transitioned into his/her psychological sex. Gardiner,
Littleton, and other cases that reject medical testimony adopt standards
of sex determination consonant with a view that such an inquiry is not
necessary, because standards such as chromosomal makeup and/or
presence of internal sexual organs, standards that "do not change with
either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. ,17
On the other hand, the line of cases that recognizes and gives legal
consideration to a transsexual's "conflict between physical anatomy and
psychological identity or psychological sex""8 finds that a factual inquiry
into the transition from biological sex to psychological sex is necessary
to determine sex and adopt a standard consonant with that view. In
M T. v. J. T, for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, held that:
If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postop-
erative [sic] transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment,
thereby possessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a
male or female, as the case may be, we perceive no legal bar-
rier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public
policy to prevent that person's identification at least for pur-
poses of marriage to the sex finally indicated.99
The court was "impelled to the conclusion" by "expert testimony"
that "if the anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are
made to conform to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex,
then identity by sex must be governed by the congruence of these stan-
dards."100
97. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
98. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
99. Id. at210-11.
100. Id. at 209. See also id. at 206, 211 ("The examination of plaintiff before the operation
showed that she had a penis, scrotum and testicles. After the operation she did not
have those organs but had a vagina and labia which were 'adequate for sexual inter-
course' and could function as any female vagina, that is, for 'traditional penile/vaginal
intercourse.' [The] plaintiff had ... silicone injections in her breasts; [had been]
treated ... continuously with female hormones to demasculinize her body and to
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Similarly, in In Re: The Marriage of MichaelJ Kantaras,'0 ' a highly
publicized case argued on CourtTV 0 2 and decided after Gardiner, a
Florida judge was faced with determining the validity of a marriage that
involved a female-to-male transsexual as part of an adoption case. Over
seven hundred pages into his opinion, Judge O'Brien identified two ap-
proaches to transsexual marriage. 0 3 One he labeled the "traditionalist"
approach and the other reformist. After analyzing both traditionalist
and reformist cases, Judge O'Brien concluded:
It is unmistakenly clear the traditionalist view point does not
believe that transsexualism as a true medical phenomena, is a
matter for the Courts, rather, it is for the Legislature to decide
if it deserves much attention or consideration by the courts
where marriage is concerned.'
O'Brien rejected the traditionalist view and allowed "the medical
community [to come] to the aid of the Court"'' 6 in its attempt to under-
stand transsexualism: "The law has no basis in medical fact to reclassify
what science declares. There is no authority given the Courts to practice
medicine. And, least of all, the subjective bias of a judge is not to be dis-
guised as legislative intent.' ' 0 7 This position contrasts with the Gardiner
court's use of dictionary definitions of man and woman as a means to
mask the adoption of a sex-determination standard, and the way in
which it did so under the cloak of "legislative deference."'0 8 Dismissing
the traditionalist approach embodied by Gardiner, O'Brien adopted the
position that "the battle of the dictionaries is not an adequate substitute
feminize it at the same time."). But see ANDREw N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURIS-
PRUDENCE: DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 63-64 (2002) (Sharpe concludes that the
creation of a functional vagina in M.T v. J.T. "proves, in and of itself, to be insuffi-
cient for the purposes of legal recognition of sex claims. For law also desires to know
MT's desire, to know that it is heterosexual, and to be assured through that knowl-
edge as to the 'authenticity' of her transgender status." Sharpe posits that "this
interrogation of transgender pasts is driven, at least in part, by legal anxiety over the
perceived proximity of transgender to the homosexual body.").
101. In re Marriage of Michael J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, 511998DR005375xxxxWS
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2003), at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf"
102. See Matt Bean, Florida Transsexual Granted Custody of Children, COURTTV, Feb. 21,
2003, at http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/verdict_crv.html.
103. See Kantaras, at 722.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 728.
106. Id.at 708.
107. Id.
108. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002). See also supra Part II.B.1.
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for medical knowledge."' 9 Ultimately, the acceptance of medical testi-
mony as to who is male and female lead Judge O'Brien to reject
chromosomes as the only basis of sex determination in favor of an ap-
proach that also considers "gender and self identity.....
In summary, there are two legal approaches to transsexual marriage.
One approach, stemming from judicial acceptance that there is an under-
lying disconnect between mental sex and physical sexual attributes in
transsexual individuals, validates marriages that involve post-operative
transsexuals. Courts following this approach recognize that medical at-
tempts to reconcile physical sexual attributes with psychological sex
deserve consideration when determining the sex of a transsexual for pur-
poses of marriage. The other approach, often laced with religious
rhetoric,"' binary notions of sex," 2 and tenuous links to legislative defer-
ence,"' invalidates marriages that involve post-operative transsexuals." 4
Courts following this approach adopt sex-determination standards that
make invisible any medical efforts to reconcile psychological sex with
some or all physical sexual attributes.
III. POST-OPERATIVE TRANSSEXUAL
IMMIGRATION VIA MARRIAGE
As previously mentioned, DOMA prohibits gay and lesbian immi-
gration via marriage." 5 It defines marriage for any "Act of Congress" and
"any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States" as a "legal union between one
man and one woman" and defines spouse, for the same purposes, as "a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. '" 6 Since DOMA
fails to define "opposite sex," "man," or "woman,'' 7 however, it is inevi-
table that it will fall upon a U.S. federal court or government agency to
determine the fate of transsexual individuals and their spouses in the
109. See Kantaras, at 709.
110. Kantaras, at 797.
111. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999) (framing the issue as:
"[Clan a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counsel-
ing, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?").
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224; see also Part II.B. 1.
114. Assuming, of course, that the other partners in the marriages are of the same sex as
the original physical sex of the post-operative transsexuals.
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context of immigration via marriage. The first step in this process is to
determine where Congress intended transsexuals to fall within its binary
sex classification of "man" and "woman." 8
A. A Uniform Sex-Determination Standard
Must Be Adoptedfor DOMA
As explained in Part II, there are two legal approaches to transsex-
ual sex-determination within the marital context. Cases that invalidate
marriages reject medical recognition of transsexualism and adopt corre-
sponding sex-determination standards that ignore medical procedures,
such as hormone treatment and surgery, aimed at reconciling psycho-
logical sex with the sex indicated by some or all physical attributes." 9
The chromosomal and "womb, cervix or ovaries" standards used in
Littleton, '2 and the "produce ova and bear offspring" standard for wom-
anhood used in Gardiner,' are examples of judicial sex-determination
tests that ignore the impact of medical procedures on sex.122
On the other hand, cases that validate transsexual marriages accept
medical recognition of transsexualism and adopt corresponding sex-
118. Courts have generally affirmed the rule that "the validity of a marriage is determined
by the law of the place where it is contracted or celebrated; if valid there, it is valid
everywhere." Matter of H, 9 I & N Dec. 640, 641 (B.I.A. 1962). A federal sex-
determination standard that characterizes valid transsexual marriages as "opposite-
sex" would merely shift the inquiry to the state level, not preclude immigration via
marriage under DOMA. At the state level, marriages would be voidable-not void-
even if not recognized by the intended U.S. state of residence. See Matter of M, 3 I &
N Dec. 465 (B.I.A. 1948) (holding that legal incestuous Italian marriage was valid for
immigration purposes despite the illegality of incestuous marriages in Illinois). How-
ever, if marriages between post-operative transsexuals and individuals of the opposite
sex would also subject the couple to criminal prosecution by the intended state of
residence, then the marriage is void and not cognizable for immigration purposes. See
Matter of T, 8 I & N Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1960) (holding that lack of criminal sanctions
for incestuous marriage in Pennsylvania permitted immigration via marriage of legally
married Czechoslovakia uncle and niece despite such incestuous marriages being ille-
gal in Pennsylvania). Therefore, despite the aforementioned refusal of a few states to
recognize marriages that involve post-operative transsexual individuals, the relevant
inquiry remains at the federal level, specifically whether DOMA precludes post-
operative transsexual immigration via marriage.
119. See supra Part II.B.
120. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
121. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
122. It is currently not possible to change an individual's chromosomal makeup, nor is it
medically possible for a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to produce ova and
bear offspring.
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determination standards that take account of sex realignment medical
procedures. 23 These standards ascribe importance to a factual inquiry
into the degree to which psychological sex has been reconciled with
some or all physical sexual attributes. 124
Since this Article demonstrates that sex-determination standards ac-
tually flow from an underlying rejection or acceptance of medical
understanding of transsexualism, 125 whether Congress intended post-
operative transsexuals to be considered "male" or "female" for purposes
of DOMA depends on whether Congress intended to reject or accept
transsexualism. Specifically, it depends on whether Congress intended to
recognize that transsexuals have a disconnect between psychological sex
and some or all physical sexual attributes, and therefore whether Con-
gress intended to attribute importance to medical procedures such as
hormone treatment and surgery meant to reconcile that sexual discon-
nect. Since DOMA and its legislative history are silent on this issue, a
search for answers must begin elsewhere.
1. Federal Precedent
Although Congress has not expressly addressed whether it accepts
medical evidence that there is a mental component to sex, limited case
law exists regarding transsexual inclusion under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and in the context of a dispute over a discharge
from the United States Army for alleged homosexual activities.
Title VII cases, however, do not speak to congressional intent re-
garding sex determination. Instead, they essentially determine that
discrimination based on one's status as a transsexual does not fall under
Title VII because sex, as intended by Congress, includes only one's
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See supra Part II.B; see also M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976) (ascribing importance to the fact that "the transsexual's gender and geni-
talia are no longer discordant; they have been harmonized through medical
treatment. Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically unified and fully capa-
ble of sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and
anatomy."); see In re Marriage of Michael J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA,
511998DR005375xxxxWS, at 793 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2003), at http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf (noting the importance to the de-
cision that the transsexual at issue had taken several medical, social, and legal steps to
harmonize psychological and anatomical sex).
125. See supra Part II.B.
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status as male or female, not one's status as a transsexual.'26 One Title
VII case explicitly left open the question of whether Congress intended
"female" to encompass a post-operative male-to-female transsexual: "If
[the defendant] had considered Ulane [a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual] to be female and had discriminated against her because she
was female ... then the argument might be made that Title VII ap-
plied."'27 Similarly, another case states that "transsexuals claiming
discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would clearly state a
cause of action under Title VII." ' However, the case makes no attempt
to determine whether the transsexual plaintiff is male or female, and
hence it is unclear whether the reference to sex is to pre- or post-
operative sex.
Similarly, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit avoided making a determina-
tion of sex in Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, a case regarding discharge from
the United States Army due to alleged homosexual activities.'29 In that
case, an army enlistee, Marie Von Hoffburg, sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief and monetary damages after being discharged because of
her marriage to Kristian Von Hoffburg, a female-to-male transsexual.3
The Army Administrative Elimination Board based its decision to dis-
charge the plaintiff on a determination that her female-to-male
transsexual husband was a biological female and therefore that plaintiff
was engaging in a female/female homosexual relationship.'' The Fifth
Circuit, however, refused to classify the status of the Von Hoffburg
marriage as either heterosexual or homosexual and instead based its deci-
sion on Marie's failure to exhaust all of her administrative remedies. The
corresponding question of Kristian's sex was left unresolved. In an early
footnote on the use of pronouns, however, the court noted, "Although
126. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that "(a]lthough Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against transsexuals,
,transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would
clearly state a cause of action under Title VII.'"); Sommers v. Budget Marketing, 667
F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that discrimination against individuals be-
cause they are transsexual does not fall under Title VII); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen, 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that "Holloway has not
claimed to have treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but rather be-
cause she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex. This type of claim is not
actionable under Title VII and is certainly not in violation of the doctrines of Due
Process and Equal Protection.").
127. Uane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
128. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664.
129. 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. Id.
131. Id. at636 n.7.
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defendants contend that Kristian Von Hoffburg is a biological female,
for purposes of clarity we will use masculine pronouns or the name Von
Hoffburg to refer to him. We do not know, factually, whether Kristian
Von Hoffburg is a biological female, or a biological male, or both.
1 2
Despite the footnote's indication of a judicial unwillingness to delve
into sex-determination standards, its acknowledgment that Kristian may
in fact possess both male and female characteristics is an interesting de-
parture from the rigid binary sex classifications present in several cases
discussed in Part II.1"
2. State Precedent
Although DOMA is silent on the sex-determination standard by
which post-operative transsexuals should be judged, and although fed-
eral courts have done little to fill in that gap, state precedent may be
useful. There is clear evidence of states' views on medical reconciliation
of psychological sex with physical sexual attributes in the form of stat-
utes that regulate post-operative transsexual birth certificate changes.
134
The majority of U.S. states have adopted statutes that specifically
allow post-operative transsexuals to be legally recognized as their post-
operative sex. 1 5 In Kentucky, for example, a sworn statement by a li-
censed physician indicating that "the gender of an individual born in
the Commonwealth has been changed by surgical procedure and a cer-
tified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction changing
that individual's name" will suffice to change a transsexual's legal
sex. 136 Similarly, in Arizona, a sworn statement from a licensed physi-
cian in good standing that he has performed a surgical operation or a
chromosomal count indicating a different sex than that listed on the
132. Id. at 635 n.4.
133. See supra Part II.A for a critique of binary sex classification.
134. The earliest such statute dates all the way back to 1968. See Rose, supra note 51, at
299 n.284.
135. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, AMENDING BIRTH CERTIFICATES TO
REFLECT YOUR CORRECT SEXc STATE-BY-STATE CHART, at http://www.
lambdalegal.orgbinary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/169.pdf [hereinafter LAMBDA].
See also In re Marriage of Michael J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA,
511998DR005375xxxxWS, at 794 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2003), at http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf (noting that "[t]he gender or sex of a
person at birth as evidenced by a birth certificate may be relevant but is not by law disposi-
tive. There is a presumption of correctness for most purposes, but it is a rebuttable
presumption in the face of medical evidence.").
136. Ky. Rev. Star. Ann. § 213.121(5) (Michie 2003).
[Vol. 10:237
SEX DETERMINATION FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES
original birth certificate will be sufficient to change the legal sex of a
transsexual.'
Only two states, Tennessee and Ohio, prohibit post-operative
transsexuals from changing their legal sex to correspond with their pre-
existing psychological sex and their medically corrected physical sex."'
In Tennessee, the statute says simply that "[t]he sex of an individual will
not be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex
change surgery."' 39 In Ohio, there is no statute expressly prohibiting
recognition of post-operative sex, but there is a lower court decision that
interprets Ohio's birth certificate statute as precluding such recogni-
tion. 1
40
State lawmakers have clearly spoken, and although not unanimous,
the consensus is that the post-operative sex of transsexuals should be




a. The United Kingdom
Similar to the American transsexual cases discussed in Part II, there
are two competing international approaches to transsexual sex determi-
nation.12 The first approach was developed in the United Kingdom in
the early 1970s. 4 That approach, articulated in Corbett v. Corbett, '4 is
137. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-326(a)(4 ) (West 2003).
138. For an argument that all states have a constitutional obligation to recognize amended
legal sex in states that permit such amendments, see Shana Brown, Sex Changes and
"Opposite-Sex "Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Compel Interstate
Recognition of Transgendered Persons'Amended Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 SAr
DIEGO L. REv. 1113, 1152-54 (2001).
139. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2001).
140. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987) (holding that an alteration of
the sex designation on a birth certificate should be prohibited because it would lead
to a change in the post-operative transsexual's legal sex for purposes of marriage).
This decision cites Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3705.20. This section of the code has been
updated and is now section 3705.15. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3705.15 (Anderson
2002).
141. See LAMBDA, supra note 135.
142. Part III.A.3 will focus on legal approaches used by the United Kingdom and the
European Court of Human of Human Rights. For a summary of other international
cases that have addressed transsexual sex determination within the context of mar-
riage, see supra note 58.
143. 2 All E.R 33, 83 (P. 1970).
144. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33.
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cited by every transsexual marriage case discussed in this Article, and the
majority of cases encountered while researching it. The impact Corbett
has had on transsexual sex-determination jurisprudence cannot be over-
stated. That said, as with the line of cases that invalidate transsexual
marriage examined in Part II, Corbett can readily be distilled to an un-
derlying rejection of transsexualism, and the corresponding adoption of
a sex-determination standard that erases medical efforts to address it:
[T]he biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at
birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the
natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by
medical or surgical means. The respondent's operation, there-
fore, cannot affect her true sex. The only cases where the term
'change of sex' is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to
sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further
medical investigation.1
45
The court implicitly acknowledges a distinction between physical
sexual attributes and psychological sex. 146 Once it makes that distinction,
it rejects psychological sex, and thus transsexualism itself, as inconse-
quential . The court does this by labeling biological sex the
respondent's "true sex."' 48 After the importance of the respondent's psy-
chological sex is rejected, the court concludes that surgery, hormone
therapy, and other medical procedures merely make the respondent an
"Iaccomplished female impersonator"' and form no basis for legal rec-
ognition of her post-operative sex. The Corbett court ultimately adopts a
sex-determination standard similar to the one adopted in Littleton v.
Prange, 150 a standard based on chromosomal elements and internal sex-
151ual organs.
145. Id. at 47.
146. The court also expressly acknowledges that the respondent is "psychologically ... a
transsexual." Id.
147. The hallmark of transsexualism is a disconnect between psychological sex and some
or all physical sexual attributes. See note 51 and accompanying text.
148. Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 47.
149. Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 47.
150. 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999).
151. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10:237
SEX DETERMINATION FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES
b. European Court of Human Rights
On July 11, 2002, the European Court of Human Rights unani-
mously held in Case of Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom that
the United Kingdom's refusal to recognize post-operative transsexuals as
their post-operative sex violated Articles 8 (right to respect for private
life) and 12 (right to marry) of the European Convention on Human
Rights.'52 This decision reflects the modern international approach to• • • 153
sex determination and directly impacts forty-four European Conven-
tion countries. These countries have a combined population of almost
one billion.'54
The Goodwin opinion is particularly noteworthy for several rea-
sons. First, it approaches transsexual sex determination from a human
rights perspective.'55 The focus of the court is not so much on chromo-
somes and external sexual organs as it is on human rights. This shift in
focus makes the opinion much less clinical than the ones previously de-
scribed in this Article, and more in tune with an intuitive understanding
of what is fair and just. The court takes judicial notice, for example, of
the "stress and alienation arising from a discordance between the posi-
tion in society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status
imposed by law which refuses to recognize the change of gender.'
' 56
This refusal to legally recognize transsexuals as their post-operative sex,
152. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002). This opinion, though final, has not yet been officially
released and may be subject to editorial revisions.
153. Id. at Part II.H.55 (citing a 1998 study which found "an unmistakable trend in the
member States of the Council of Europe towards giving full legal recognition to gen-
der re-assignment. In particular ... out of thirty seven countries analysed only four
(including the United Kingdom) did not permit a change to be made to a person's
birth certificate in one form or another to reflect the re-assigned sex of that person.");
Id. at Part II.H.56 (citing a follow-up study submitted on Jan. 17, 2002, that showed
a trend in countries outside Europe of giving full legal recognition to sex re-
assignment). See also In re Kevin, [20011 FamCA 1074 (holding that to follow the
reasoning set forth in Corbett would be to take Australia "in a direction that is gener-
ally contrary to development in other countries").
154. Population statistics available at http://www.world-gazetteer.com/home/htm.
155. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at Part I.B.6.90 (articulating that the "very essence of the
Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom" and that "[i]n the
twenty first century the right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical
and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society cannot be regarded as
a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues
involved. In short, the unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals
live in an intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer sustain-
able.").
156. Id. at Part I.B.2.77.
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the court concludes, results in "[a] conflict between social reality and
law.., which places the transsexual in an anomalous position, in which
he or she may experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxi-
ety. ' 157 The court is also "struck by the fact" that although the sex-
realignment surgery was provided for by the United Kingdom's national
health service to medically reconcile physical sexual attributes with psy-
chological sex, it was "not met with full recognition in law, which might
be regarded as the final and culminating step in the long and difficult
process of transformation which the transsexual has undergone."'58 The
court's approach clearly emphasizes equity, not formalism.
The second thing worth noting about Goodwin is that in a section
called "Medical and scientific considerations,"'59 the court expressly ad-
dresses, and then accepts, the "wide international recognition" that
transsexualism has "as a medical condition for which treatment is pro-
vided in order to afford relief."'6 ° Unlike the American marriage cases
discussed in Part II, which accept or reject scientific understanding
without expressly doing so, this court more or less makes explicit its sex-
determination standard is the natural extension of an underlying accep-
tance of transsexualism:
The United Kingdom national health service, in common
with the vast majority of Contract States, acknowledges the ex-
istence of the condition [of transsexalism] and provides or
permits treatment, including irreversible surgery. The medical
and surgical acts which in this case rendered the gender re-
assignment possible were indeed carried out under the supervi-
sion of the national health authorities.... [G] iven the
numerous and painful interventions involved in such surgery
and the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve
a change in social gender role, can it be suggested that there is
anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision taken by a per-
son to undergo gender re-assignment. In those circumstances,
the ongoing scientific and medical debate as to the exact




158. Id. at Part I.B.2.78.
159. Id. at Part I.B.3.
160. Id. at Part I.B.3.81 (citing both the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual "DSM-IV,"
which replaced the diagnosis of transsexualism with "gender identity disorder," and
the International Classification of Diseases).
161. Id. at Part I.B.3.81.
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In other words, the court acknowledges that transsexualism exists,
that its precise causes are unknown, and that despite the lack of medical
certainty various procedures are utilized to ameliorate the condition.
Legal recognition, the court reasons, logically flows from this medical
intervention.
The final thing worth noting about Goodwin is that the court
clearly identifies chromosomal elements as the primary biological factors
that medical science cannot change. 16' As discussed in Part II.B.2, courts
that invalidate transsexual marriages do so because they reject the under-
lying disconnect between physical sexual attributes and psychological
sex in transsexuals, and therefore adopt sex-determination standards that
make invisible medical procedures such as surgery and hormone ther-
apy, procedures that seek to eliminate that disconnect. The Goodwin
court identifies that "a transsexual cannot acquire all the biological char-
acteristics of the assigned sex," but notes that "with increasingly
sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal
unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal
element. '' 163 Perhaps tacitly acknowledging that other courts have used
chromosomal standards as a pretext to undermine medical efforts to
address the sexual disconnect in transsexuals, the Goodwin court declares
that "[i]t is not apparent to the [c]ourt that the chromosomal element,
amongst all others, must inevitably take on decisive significance for the
purposes of legal attribution of gender identity for transsexuals. ' '
The European Court of Human Rights did not create a transsexual
sex-determination standard for contract states in Goodwin.'65 Rather, the
court mandated that they give legal recognition to the post-operative,
162. Id. at Part I.B.3.82.
163. Id.
164. Id. See also In re Marriage of Michael J. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA,
511998DR005375xxxxWS, at 702 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2003) (discussing use of chro-
mosomes in sex-determination standards).
165. See Goodwin 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at Part III.A.120 (holding at http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf that "[ilt will be for the United
Kingdom Government in due course to implement such measures as it considers ap-
propriate to fulfil [sic] its obligations to secure the applicant's, and other transsexuals',
right to respect for private life and right to marry in compliance with this judg-
ment.")
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S166
not the pre-operative, sex of transsexuals. It was left to individualS!167
states to implement this mandate by crafting their own standards.
CONCLUSION
The delineation of man from woman, and woman from man, is
not clear, precise, or intuitive when transsexuals are involved. A court
faced with this delineation in the shadow of DOMA's silence must de-
termine, as a matter of law, what Congress intended "men" and
"women" to be.
State court marriage cases provide a place to begin. These cases
illustrate two competing approaches to sex determination. One approach,
engendered by the acceptance of a disconnect between physical and
psychological sex, views legal recognition of the post-operative sex as the
logical offspring of medical efforts to address that disconnect. The other
approach, brought about by judicial rejection of transsexualism, legally
recognizes pre-operative sex. That approach is often characterized by
religious rhetoric, 16  binary notions of sex, 169 and tenuous links to
legislative deference.' Both approaches, however, indicate sex
determination can only be realized through an examination of whether
166. See Goodwin 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at Part III.A.20 (holding that "it is the lack of legal
recognition of the gender re-assignment of post-operative transsexuals which lies at
the heart of the complaints in this application.").
167. See Goodwin 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at Part III.A.20. There are many standards by which
the post-operative sex of transsexuals can be recognized. The most well-reasoned
standard encountered while researching this Article is the standard used by Australia.
That standard, worth repeating in its entirety, holds that:
To determine a person's sex for the purpose[s] of ... marriage, all relevant
matters need to be considered. I do not seek to state a complete list, or
suggest that any factors necessarily have more importance than others.
However the relevant matters include ... the person's biological and
physical characteristics at birth (including gonads, genitals and chromo-
somes); the person's life experiences, including the sex in which he or she is
brought up and the person's attitude to it; the person's self-perception as a
man or woman; the extent to which the person has functioned in society as
a man or a woman; any hormonal, surgical or other medical sex reassign-
ment treatments the person has undergone, and the consequences of such
treatment; and the person's biological, psychological and physical charac-
teristics at the time of the marriage.
Kevin, [2001] FamCA 1074.
168. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999).
169. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended to accept, or reject, transsexualism itself.
Unfortunately, federal case law does not elucidate that intent. A
comparative-law analysis, though, reveals that state legislatures have
clearly signaled an intent to recognize transsexuals as their post-operative
sex. It also reveals that the unmistakable international trend is to do the
same.
At the end of the day, however, a court deciding whether post-
operative transsexuals are "men" or "women" under DOMA will only
have to ask itself one question: Do transsexuals, in fact, exist? If it ac-
cepts medical evidence and testimony that they do, then a sex-
determination standard consonant with efforts to reconcile psychologi-
cal sex with some or all physical sexual attributes should be adopted. 71
Alternatively, if it views transsexualism as some sort of medical trickery,
then it should adopt a standard based on a characteristic untouchable by
physicians and scientists-chromosomal makeup, ability to produce
sperm or bear children, or composition of internal sexual organs. Re-
gardless of the standard adopted, judicial honesty demands that the
underlying acceptance or rejection of transsexualism itself be explicit. t
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
STATUTES REGULATING BIRTH CERTIFICATE CHANGES
AFTER SEX-REALIGNMENT SURGERY
STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
Alabama Ala. Code 22-9A- 19 Certified copy of an order from
a court of competent jurisdiction
indicating a change of sex by
surgical procedure.
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 18.50.290-360 Authorizes birth certificate
amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sworn statement from licensed
§ 3 6 -32 6 (a) (4) physician in good standing that
he has performed a surgical op-
eration or a chromosomal count
indicating a different sex than
that listed on the original birth
certificate. The state registrar
reserves the right to require more
proof or independent profes-
sional evaluation before creating
the new birth certificate.
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. A certified copy of an order of a
§ 20-18-307(d) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating that the sex of an
individual born in this state has
been changed by surgical proce-
dure and that such individual's
name has been changed.
California Cal. Health & Safety Code The petition for birth certificate
§ 103430 change must be accompanied by
an affidavit of a physician
documenting the sex change.
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. A certified copy of an order of a
25-2-115(4) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating that the sex of an
individual born in this state has
been changed by surgical proce-
dure and that such individual's
name has been changed.
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Authorizes birth certificate





Fla. Stat. Ch. 29,
§ 382.016
Authorizes birth certificate
amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery. However, the Florida
Attorney General has issued an
opinion that amendatory legisla-
tion is required in order to
permit state registrars to amend
birth certificates issued for indi-
viduals who have undergone sex
reassignment surgery. Op. Atty.
Gen., 076-213, Nov. 10, 1976.
(Kantaras at 763)
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. A certified copy of a court order
§ 31-10-23(e) indicating the sex of an individ-
ual born in this state has been
changed by surgical procedure
and that such individual's name
has been changed.
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. Affidavit of a physician that the
§ 338-17.7(4)(b) physician has examined the birth
registrant and determined that
the sex designation on the birth
certificate is no longer correct.
The director of health may fur-
ther investigate and require
additional information.
Idaho Id. APA 16.02.08 Authorizes birth certificate
§ 201.06 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
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STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16 § 3131 Authorizes birth certificate
amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
D.C. Code Ann. "Upon receipt of a certified copy
§ 7-217(d) of an order of the Court indicat-
ing that the sex of an individual
born in the District has changed
by surgical procedure and that
such individual's name has been
changed, the certificate of birth
of such individual shall be
amended as prescribed by regula-
tion."
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STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
Illinois 410 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. Affidavit of a physician that he
§ 535/17 has performed an operation on a
person and that by reason of the
operation, the sex of the person
listed on their birth certificate is
no longer correct and should be
changed. The state official re-
serves the right to investigate or
require further information.
Indiana Ind. Code Mentions that changes based on
§ 16-37-2-10 DNA evidence are admissible for
paternity, but does not address
sex-realignment surgery.
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. Notarized affidavit by a licensed
§ 144.23.3 physician and surgeon, or osteo-
pathic physician and surgeon
stating that by reason of surgery
or other treatment, the sex listed
on the birth certificate is no
longer correct. Further investiga-
tion may be required.
Kansas Kan. Admin. Regs. Changes are available through an
28-17-20 (b)(1)(A)(i) administrative process. The
items recording the registrant's
sex may be amended if the
amendment is substantiated with
the applicant's affidavit that the
sex was incorrectly recorded or
with a medical certificate sub-
stantiating that a physiological
or anatomical change occurred.
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.121(5) A sworn statement by a licensed
physician indicating that the
gender of an individual born in
the Commonwealth has been
changed by surgical procedure
and a certified copy of an order
of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion changing that individual's
name.
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STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Must petition for birth certifi-
§ 40:62 cate change in court of
competent jurisdiction. The
court may require any proof that
it "deems necessary to be con-
vinced that the petitioner was
properly diagnosed as a transsex-
ual or pseudo-hermaphrodite,
that sex reassignment or correc-
tive surgery has been properly
performed upon the petitioner
.. . ..making the person's current
sex inconsistent with that listed
on their birth certificate.
Maine
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Health-General A certified copy of an order of a
§ 4-214 (b)(5) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating the sex of an individ-
ual born in this State has been
changed by surgical procedure
and whether such individual's
name has been changed.
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 46 An affidavit must be given to the
§ 13 (e) town clerk, executed by the
person to whom the record re-
lates, and accompanied by a
physician's notarized statement
that the person named on the
birth record has completed sex
reassignment surgery, so-called,
and is not of the sex recorded on
said record. Said affidavit shall
also be accompanied by a certi-
fied copy of the legal change of
name aforementioned above.
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2831 Affidavit by a physician certify-
(c) ing that sex realignment has
been performed.
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Authorizes birth certificate
§ 144.218 (4) amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery. Mentions that "vital
statistics" may be changed.
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. State registrar may change the
§ 41-57-21 sex listed on the birth certificate
at their discretion based on two
affidavits from reputable persons
having knowledge of the facts of
the case.
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STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. A certified copy of an order of a
§ 193.215 (9) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating the sex of an individ-
ual born in this state has been
changed by surgical procedure
and that such individual's name
has been changed.
Montana Mont. Code Ann. Department has discretion over
§ 50-15-204 what type of proof will be re-
quired for amending vital
statistics.
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. A notarized affidavit from the
§ 71-604.01 physician that performed sex
realignment surgery on an indi-
vidual born in this state and a
certified copy of an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction
changing the name of such per-
son.
Nevada Nev. Rev. Star. 440.630 A board makes decisions as to
birth certificate amendments.
Does not specifically address sex-
realignment surgery.
New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules for amending birth certifi-
126:23-a cares are adopted by the
commissioner of the department
of health and human services.
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. The State registrar shall issue the
26:8-40.12 (a) amended certificate of birth
upon receipt of (1) a certified
copy of an order from a court of
competent jurisdiction which
indicates the name of the person
has been changed and (2) a
medical certificate from the
person's licensed physician which
indicates the sex of the person
has been changed by surgical
procedure.
[Vol. 10:237
SEX DETERMINATION FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES
STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. A duly notarized statement from
§ 24-14-25 (D) the person in charge of an insti-
tution or from the attending
physician indicating that the sex
of an individual born in this
state has been changed by surgi-
cal procedure, together with a
certified copy of an order chang-
ing the name of the person, the
certificate of birth of the indi-
vidual shall be amended as
prescribed by regulation.
New York
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. A notarized statement by the
§ 130A-1 18 (b)(4) physician who performed the
surgery, or from a licensed phy-
sician who examined the
individual and can certify that
the person has undergone sex-
realignment surgery.
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 23-02.1-25 Authorizes birth certificate
amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3705.15 Lower court interpreted Ohio
(updated since case, formerly birth certificate statute not to
3705.20) allow correction of sex designa-
tion for transsexuals. See supra
note 136.
Oklahoma Okla. Star. tit. 63, Authorizes birth certificate
§ 1-321 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. A certified copy of an order of a
§ 432.235(4) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating that the sex of an
individual born in this state has
been changed by surgical proce-
dure.
Pennsylvania 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 450.603 Authorizes birth certificate
amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws Authorizes birth certificate
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STATE STATUTE PROOF REQUIRED
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. Authorizes birth certificate
9 44-63-150 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws Authorizes birth certificate
§ 35-25-51 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. "The sex of an individual will
9 68-3-203 (d) not be changed on the original
certificate of birth as a result of
sex change surgery."
Texas Tex. Stat. Ann. Authorizes birth certificate
99 191.028, 192.011 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Utah Utah Code Ann. Order of a Utah district court or
§ 26-2-11 a court of competent jurisdiction
of another state or a province of
Canada recognizing the sex
change.
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 Authorizes birth certificate
§ 5075 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Virginia Va. Code Ann. A certified copy of an order of a
§ 32.1-269 (E) court of competent jurisdiction
indicating that the sex of an
individual has been changed by
medical procedure.
Washington
West Virginia W Va. Code Authorizes birth certificate
§ 16-5-24 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. A court or administrative order
§ 69.15 (1)(a)(b) issued in this state, in another
state or in Canada or under the
valid order of a court of any
federally recognized Indian tribe,
band or nation if the order pro-
vides for an name change with
sex change.
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. Authorizes birth certificate
§ 35-1-424 amendments but does not spe-
cifically address sex-realignment
surgery.
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